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Abstract. In this paper we propose the technology for construct-
ing propositional encodings of discrete functions. It is aimed at solv-
ing inversion problems of considered functions using state-of-the-
art SAT solvers. We implemented this technology in the form of the
software system called TRANSALG, and used it to construct SAT en-
codings for a number of cryptanalysis problems. By applying SAT
solvers to these encodings we managed to invert several crypto-
graphic functions. In particular, we used the SAT encodings produced
by TRANSALG to construct the family of two-block MD5 collisions
in which the first 10 bytes are zeros. Also we used TRANSALG en-
coding for the widely known A5/1 keystream generator to solve sev-
eral dozen of its cryptanalysis instances in a distributed computing
environment. In the paper we compare in detail the functionality of
TRANSALG with that of similar software systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, there appeared many works on cryptanalysis,
which use various automated software systems. These include soft-
ware systems aimed at solving cryptanalysis equations using generic
algorithms as well as systems that generate such equations based on
descriptions of considered cryptographic functions.
Among the promising methods for solving equations correspond-
ing to cryptanalysis problems we would like to note algebraic crypt-
analysis [1] and also actively developing SAT-based cryptanalysis
[11]. The latter is based on the state-of-the-art algorithms for solving
Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT). These algorithms are success-
fully applied to combinatorial problems from various areas [4]. Also
the cryptanalysis of some cryptographic functions used in the real
world (such as A5/1 keystream generator and hash functions from
the MD family) was performed via SAT.
One of the main problems that arises when one wants to apply
SAT to cryptanalysis of a particular cipher, consists in obtaining a
SAT encoding for a corresponding algorithm. A lot of cryptographic
primitives have a number of specific properties that make this pro-
cess quite nontrivial. Therefore it is relevant to develop software sys-
tems for automating construction of SAT encodings of cryptographic
functions. In the recent years several systems of that sort appeared.
In [31] we described the TRANSALG software system developed
by us specifically for solving inversion problems of cryptographic
functions via SAT. Note that in [31] due to limitations on the volume
of the paper we could not include any results of computational ex-
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periments on the use of TRANSALG for solving cryptanalysis prob-
lems. In the present paper we describe new results on inversion of
several cryptographic functions that were obtained with the use of
TRANSALG system and compare TRANSALG functionality with that
of several similar systems.
Let us give a brief outline of the paper. In the second section we in-
troduce main notions regarding SAT and describe the ideas underly-
ing SAT-based cryptanalysis. In the third section we briefly describe
the TRANSALG system. In the fourth section we compare encodings
produced by TRANSALG with that constructed by other similar sys-
tems. Also in this section we briefly compare the effectiveness of
SAT and SMT solvers in application to cryptanalysis instances and
conclude that SAT solvers nowadays are more effective in this par-
ticular area. In the fifth section we use TRANSALG encodings to per-
form SAT-based cryptanalysis of ciphering systems used in the real
world. In particular, we describe the cryptanalysis of the A5/1 gen-
erator in the distributed computing environment and show the results
on the search for collisions of MD4 and MD5 hash functions.
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
SAT-BASED CRYPTANALYSIS
Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT) consists in the following: for
an arbitrary Boolean formula to decide whether it is satisfiable or not.
It can be effectively (in polynomial time on the size of an original
formula) reduced to SAT for a formula in the Conjunctive Normal
Form (CNF). Usually in the context of SAT it is assumed that we
consider formula in this form. Since SAT is NP-complete problem,
today there are no algorithms that could solve SAT in polynomial
time. However, there is a number of heuristic algorithms that show
good effectiveness in application to various practical problems. In the
recent years the scope of application of these algorithms has greatly
increased [4].
By {0, 1}∗ we denote the set of all binary words of an arbitrary
finite length. By discrete functions we mean arbitrary (possibly, par-
tial) functions of the kind:
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. (1)
Hereinafter we consider only total computable discrete functions. In
other words we assume that f is specified by some program (al-
gorithm) Af , that has finite runtime on each word from {0, 1}∗.
The program Af specifies a family of functions of the kind fn :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗, n ∈ N1. The problem of inversion of an ar-
bitrary function fn is formulated as follows: based on the known
y ∈ Range fn and the known algorithm Af , find such x ∈ {0, 1}n
that fn(x) = y.
Many cryptanalysis problems can be formulated as inversion prob-
lems of discrete functions. For example, suppose that given a secret
key x ∈ {0, 1}n , fn generates a pseudorandom sequence (generally
speaking, of an arbitrary length), that is later used to cipher some
plaintext via bit-wise XOR. Such a sequence is called a keystream.
Knowing some fragment of plaintext lets us know the corresponding
fragment of keystream, i.e. some word y for which we can consider
the problem of finding such x ∈ {0, 1}n, that fn(x) = y. Regarding
cryptographic keystream generators this corresponds to the so called
known plaintext attack.
Let us give another example. Total functions of the kind f :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c, where c is some constant are called hash func-
tions. If n is the length of the input message and n > c, then there ex-
ist such x1, x2, x1 6= x2, that fn(x1) = fn(x2). Such a pair x1, x2
is called a collision of a hash function f . A cryptographic hash func-
tion is considered compromised if one is able to find collisions of
that function in reasonable time.
The functions of the kind (1) that are used in cryptography are
usually constructed in such a way that their inversion problems are
computationally hard. Meanwhile the functions themselves should
be computed fast, otherwise the ciphering speed of the cryptosys-
tem based on such a function would be low. The ability to effectively
compute f makes it possible to apply to its inversion the approach
based on the propositional encoding of Af program. As a result we
reduce the inversion problem for an arbitrarty function of the kind fn
to the problem of finding a satisfying assignment of some satisfiable
CNF, as it follows from the Cook-Levin theorem [10]. Below we de-
scribe the basic idea how such CNFs are constructed using Boolean
circuits representing the functions of the kind fn.
Let us consider some function fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m defined
by a program Af . Analyzing Af we can construct Boolean circuit
S(fn) over some complete basis B, such that S(fn) implements fn.
Hereinafter we assume that B = {¬,∧}. The S(fn) circuit has n in-
puts and m outputs. It can be considered as marked directed acyclic
graph. In this graph n selected nodes are marked with Boolean vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn. These nodes correspond to the circuit inputs and
form the set X . All the other nodes are marked with elements from
basis B. Among them m nodes correspond to circuit outputs.
For S(fn) circuit in polynomial time on its size we can construct
CNF C(fn). For this purpose all the circuit nodes that are not input
we mark with variables, that form the set V , X
⋂
V = ∅. The vari-
ables from V are called auxiliary variables. With each logical gate
G of the circuit S(fn) we therefore assign some auxiliary variable
v(G) ∈ V . There is the subset Y , Y ⊆ V , Y = {y1, . . . , ym}
formed by the variables corresponding to S(fn) outputs.
Let v(G) be an arbitrary variable from V and G be a correspond-
ing gate. If G is a NOT-gate and u ∈ X
⋃
V is the variable linked
with the input of G then we encode the gate G with the Boolean
formula v(G) ↔ ¬u (hereinafter by ↔ we mean logical equiv-
alence). If G is an AND-gate and u, w ∈ X⋃V are variables
linked with the gate inputs then we encode G with the formula
v(G) ↔ u ∧ w. CNF-representations of Boolean functions speci-
fied by formulas v(G) ↔ ¬u and v(G) ↔ u ∧ v look as follows
(respectively):
(v(G) ∨ u) ∧ (¬v(G) ∨ ¬u)
(v(G) ∨ ¬u ∨ ¬w) ∧ (¬v(G) ∨ u) ∧ (¬v(G) ∨ w)
(2)
Thus with an arbitrary gate G of circuit S(fn) we associate CNF
C(G) of the kind (2). We will say that CNF C(G) encodes gate G,
and CNF
C(fn) =
∧
G∈S(fn)
C(G) (3)
encodes circuit S(fn). The described technique of constructing a
CNF for a circuit S(fn) is known as Tseitin transformations [41].
To a CNF C(fn) of the kind (3) we will refer as template CNF rep-
resenting the algorithm that implements fn.
Let x be an arbitrary Boolean variable. Below we will use the fol-
lowing notation: by lβ(x), β ∈ {0, 1} we denote the literal ¬x if
β = 0, and literal x if β = 1. Let (β1, . . . , βm) be an arbitrary
assignment from Rangefn ⊆ {0, 1}m. From the properties of the
Tseitin transformations it follows that CNF
C(fn) ∧ lβ1(y1) ∧ . . . ∧ lβm(ym) (4)
is satisfiable and from each assignment satisfying (4) we can ef-
fectively extract such an assignment (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ {0, 1}n that
fn(α1, . . . , αn) = (β1, . . . , βm). Thus we reduced the inversion
problem for fn to SAT for a CNF of the kind (4).
From the above SAT-based cryptanalysis looks as follows: first we
reduce an inversion problem for a considered cryptographic function
to SAT and then we apply SAT solving technologies to a SAT in-
stance obtained. In the next section we describe the software system
called TRANSALG, that was designed and developed by us specifi-
cally to produce SAT encodings for cryptographic functions.
3 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TRANSALG
SOFTWARE SYSTEM
Ideologically the TRANSALG system is built upon the principles
of symbolic execution [25]. The discrete functions are specified by
the programs for the abstract machine. TRANSALG applies standard
techniques from the compilation theory to these programs. However,
as a result of translation it produces not an executable code but a
Boolean formula that encodes a considered algorithm (in the form of
template CNF).
To describe discrete functions the TRANSALG system uses the do-
main specific language called the TA-language. The TA-language has
a C-like syntax and block structure. An arbitrary block (composite
operator) is essentially a list of instructions, and has its own (local)
scope. In the TA-language one can use nested blocks with no limit
on depth. During the analysis of a program TRANSALG constructs
a scope tree with the global scope at its root. Every identifier in a
TA-program belongs to some scope. Variables and arrays declared
outside of any block and also all functions belong to the global scope
and therefore can be accessed in any point of a program.
A TA-program is a list of functions. The main function is the en-
try point and, thus, must exist in every program. The TA-language
supports basic constructions used in procedural languages (vari-
able declarations, assignment operators, conditional operators, loops,
function calls, etc.), various integer operations and bit operations in-
cluding bit shifting and comparison.
The main data type in the TA-language is the bit type.
TRANSALG uses this type to establish links between variables used in
a TA-program and Boolean variables included into a corresponding
propositional encoding. It is important to distinguish between these
two sets of variables. Below we will refer to variables that appear
in a TA-program as program variables. All variables included in a
propositional encoding are called encoding variables.
Given a TA-program A(fn) as an input, TRANSALG constructs
the propositional encoding of the function fn. Below we will refer to
this process as the translation of the TA-program A(fn). Essentially,
the translation of the TA-program A(fn) is the symbolic execution
of this program [25].
Upon the translation of an arbitrary instruction that contains a pro-
gram variable of the bit type, TRANSALG links this program vari-
able with the corresponding encoding variable. TRANSALG estab-
lishes such links only for program variables of the bit type. Vari-
ables of other types, in particular int and void are used only as
service variables, e.g. as loop counters or to specify functions that do
not return value.
Declarations of global bit variables can have an in or an out
attribute. The in attribute marks variables that contain input data
for an algorithm. The out attribute marks variables that contain an
output of an algorithm. Local bit variables cannot be declared with
these attributes.
The translation of a TA-program has two main stages. At the first
stage, TRANSALG parses the source code of this TA-program and
constructs a syntax tree using standard techniques of the compilation
theory. At the second stage, the system performs symbolic execution
of a TA-program to construct the corresponding propositional encod-
ing.
The process of symbolic execution of a TA program can be di-
vided into elementary steps. As a result of each elementary step a
new encoding variable x is introduced and the following formula is
constructed
x↔ g (x˜1, . . . , x˜k) , (5)
in which x˜1, . . . , x˜k are some encoding variables introduced earlier
(by ↔ we denote the logical equivalence). The propositional encod-
ing of a TA program is a set of formulas of the kind (5).
Cryptographic algorithms often use various bit shifting operators
and also copy bits from one cell to another without changing their
value. During the symbolic execution of such operators there may
appear elementary steps, producing the formulas of the kind x↔ x˜.
However, we do not really need such formulas in the propositional
encoding since it is evident that without the loss of correctness we
can replace an arbitrary formula of the kind x′ ↔ g(x, . . .) by for-
mula x′ ↔ g(x˜, . . .). In other words it is not necessary to introduce
the encoding variable x. TRANSALG tracks such situations using spe-
cial data structures. The corresponding technique is described in de-
tail in [31].
The TRANSALG system has full support of conditional operators.
Let Φ(z1, . . . , zk) be an arbitrary expression of the TA language,
where z1, . . . , zk are program variables of the bit type. Assume
that these variables are linked with encoding variables x1, . . . , xk,
and that Boolean formula φ(x1, . . . , xk) is the result of transla-
tion of an expression Φ(z1, . . . , zk). Below we say that expression
Φ(z1, . . . , zk) is associated with Boolean formula φ(x1, . . . , xk).
Let us consider the BNF form of the conditional operator.
<if_statement> := if (<expr>) <statement>
[else <statement>]
Here <expr> is a predicate of a conditional operator. Assume
<expr> is Φ and expression Φ is associated with a formula φ. Let
δ1 and δ2 be Boolean formulas associated (in the aforementioned
sense) with the expressions ∆1 and ∆2 of the TA-program. Without
the loss of generality assume that in then- and else-branches we have
assignment operators z = ∆1 and z = ∆2, where z is some pro-
gram variable linked with an encoding variable x. Then during the
translation of this conditional operator TRANSALG creates a new en-
coding variable x′, links it with z and adds the following formula to
the propositional encoding:
x
′ ↔ φ ∧ δ1 ∨ ¬φ ∧ δ2. (6)
If there is no assignment z = ∆2 in the else-branch, or if there is
no else-branch, then (6) transforms into x′ ↔ φ ∧ δ1 ∨ ¬φ ∧ x.
Likewise, if there is no assignment z = ∆1 in the then-branch, then
(6) transforms into x′ ↔ φ ∧ x ∨ ¬φ ∧ δ2.
During the translation of TA-program for function fn to SAT the
TRANSALG system represents this function as a composition of func-
tions with smaller number of inputs. If fn is represented as a com-
position of only basis functions (for example, from the basis {∧,¬})
then to construct the corresponding CNF one can use only Tseitin
transformations. However, TRANSALG can represent fn as a com-
position of functions over more than two Boolean variables. To en-
code corresponding functions to SAT TRANSALG employs the truth
tables. Also in these cases TRANSALG uses Boolean minimization.
On the current stage it employs the ESPRESSO3 Boolean minimiza-
tion library. This choice is motivated by the fact that this library for
decades remains one of de facto standards in the area. The ESPRESSO
was embedded into TRANSALG as one of its modules.
4 COMPARISON OF TRANSALG WITH
SIMILAR SYSTEMS
Note, that, generally speaking, it is possible to construct SAT encod-
ings for discrete functions using various symbolic verification sys-
tems, such as CBMC [9]. However, such systems are not designed
specifically for the purpose of solving cryptanalysis problems. It
means that in practice when they are used to produce such proposi-
tional encodings, there arise a number of issues, e.g. big runtime, in-
ability to correctly interpret results since sets of input and output vari-
ables are unknown, etc. Because of this it is considered relevant to de-
velop software systems specifically for constructing SAT encodings
for cryptanalysis problems. In the paper we consider three systems
that have more or less similar functionality to that of TRANSALG.
Below we briefly describe these systems.
The GRAIN OF SALT system is designed to produce SAT encod-
ings only for cryptographic keystream generators based on the shift
registers. In [38] this system was used to construct propositional en-
codings for the Bivium, Trivium and Grain keystream generators.
Unfortunately, GRAIN OF SALT does not work with conditional op-
erators and therefore can not be used to encode a number of crypto-
graphic functions (for example the A5/1 generator).
The URSA system [23] is a generic propositional encoding tool
that is applicable to a wide class of combinatorial problems, vary-
ing from CSP (Constraint Satisfaction Problem) to cryptography. To
describe these problems URSA uses proprietary domain specific lan-
guage. To solve SAT instances produced, URSA uses two embedded
solvers: ARGOSAT and CLASP.
The CRYPTOL system [18, 19] is designed as a tool for analy-
sis of cryptographic specifications using SMT solvers. It uses func-
tional Haskell-like domain specific language to describe the algo-
rithms. Also the authors of CRYPTOL made the SAW (Software
Analysis Workbench4) tool that makes it possible to produce SAT
and SMT encodings for cryptographic problems defined in CRYP-
TOL language.
3 http://embedded.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/downloads/Espresso/index.htm
4 http://saw.galois.com/
4.1 Comparison of SAT and SMT approaches to
inversion of cryptographic fucntions
The question whether SAT or SMT solvers are better suited for
solving cryptanalysis instances is quite controversial. That is why
we compared SAT and SMT in application to cryptanalysis of two
keystream generators. The first is the strengthened version of the
Geffe generator [20] (essentially that is a special case of the Thresh-
old generator [7]). We considered the variant of this generator that
uses three Linear Feedback Shift registers (LFSRs) defined by the
following primitive polynomials:
x31 + x7 + 1
x32 + x7 + x5 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
x33 + x16 + x4 + x+ 1
Thus the secret key for this generator has the length of 96 bits. Its
registers are shifted synchronously and the keystream bit is defined
as follows:
(x1 ∧ x2)⊕ (x2 ∧ x3)⊕ (x1 ∧ x3) (7)
where by xi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}we mean the most significant bit of the i-th
LFSR (instead of (7) the standard Geffe generator uses the function
(x1 ∧x2)⊕ (x2 ∧ x3)⊕ x3). We considered the cryptanalysis prob-
lem in the following form: to find 96-bit secret key using the known
keystream fragment of length 200 bits.
In a similar way we studied the cryptanalysis of the Bivium
keystream generator [8]. In particular, we considered this problem in
the following formulation: to find initial values of 177 cells of gen-
erator registers, based on analysis of 200 bits of keystream. To make
test instances solvable in reasonable time we assumed that some bits
of secret key are already known (i.e. used the so-called guessing bits
in terms of [1]). In particular we constructed tests with 30 guessing
bits. Below we refer to this cryptanalysis problem as Bivium30.
At the current moment TRANSALG can not output encoding in
SMT format, therefore to construct SMT encodings for consid-
ered functions we used only CRYPTOL+SAW. The correspond-
ing SAT instances were generated using both CRYPTOL+SAW and
TRANSALG. For each problem outlined above we constructed 100
SMT instances generated by CRYPTOL+SAW, 100 SAT instances
generated by CRYPTOL+SAW and 100 SAT instances constructed
by TRANSALG. To solve SMT instances we used high-ranked SMT
solvers BOOLECTOR, YICES, CVC4 and Z3. The BOOLECTOR
solver showed the best results among SMT solvers. To solve SAT
instances we used widely known MINISAT solver [16]. Specifically
we used MINISAT 2.2. The results of the experiments are shown in
Table 1. The time limit for Geffe was 1 minute, time limit for Bivium
was 1 hour. The solvers were launched on one core of AMD Opteron
6276.
Table 1. Comparison between SAT and SMT
CRYPTOL+SAW TRANSALG
SMT SAT
Strengthened Geffe
Solver BOOLECTOR MINISAT MINISAT
Solved 81 100 100
Avg. time, sec. 35.69 7.69 7.14
Bivium30
Solver BOOLECTOR MINISAT MINISAT
Solved 54 83 81
Avg. time, sec. 1 744 1 165 1 262
From the presented results we can conclude that state-of-the-art
SMT solvers lose to SAT solvers if we consider their applications
to solving inversion problems of cryptographic functions. However,
we would like to point out that in this paper we do not consider the
questions regarding the construction of special Background theories,
that would take into account the features of considered cryptanalysis
problems. Moreover, we currently are not aware if there exist such
Background theories. It is possible that in future the developments in
this direction will make it possible to drastically improve the perfor-
mance of SMT solvers on cryptanalysis instances.
4.2 Comparison of SAT encodings
In the next series of experiments we considered the Bivium, Trivium
and Grain keystream generators. For these generators we constructed
SAT encodings using the GRAIN OF SALT, URSA, CRYPTOL+SAW
and TRANSALG systems.
Note that SAT-based cryptanalysis of Bivium, Trivium and Grain
was studied for example in [17, 38, 39]. In accordance with these
papers we considered the inversion problems for the following func-
tions:
f
Bivium : {0, 1}177 → {0, 1}200, fGrain : {0, 1}160 → {0, 1}160.
Cryptanalysis of Trivium was considered as the inversion problem
for function
f
Trivium : {0, 1}288 → {0, 1}300 .
The parameters of the obtained encodings are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. The parameters of encodings for Bivium, Trivium and Grain
GOS URSA CRYPTOL+SAW TRANSALG
BIVIUM
Vars 842 1 637 1 432 442
Clauses 6 635 5 975 5 308 7 960
Literals 29 455 16 995 15 060 40 320
TRIVIUM
Vars 1 887 4 284 3 097 1 587
Clauses 22 881 15 885 11 889 22 176
Literals 118 413 45 657 34 037 109 872
GRAIN
Vars 4 546 9 279 4 246 1 785
Clauses 74 269 37 317 16 522 34 165
Literals 461 069 105 925 46 402 190 388
In the next series of experiments we used the constructed SAT en-
codings for Bivium, Trivium and Grain to solve a number of crypt-
analysis instances for the corresponding keystream generators, as-
suming that a number of bits from the secret key are known. These
bits we will below refer to as guessing bits [1]. In other words assume
that we consider the inversion problem of function fn : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m in some point y ∈ Range fn. Let C(fn) be the template
CNF for fn and let Xin be the set of variables encoding the input of
fn. Then for the inversion problem for fn in point y we assume that
for some subset X ′ ⊆ Xin the values of variables from X ′ in the
preimage x ∈ {0, 1}n:fn(x) = y are known. A SAT encoding for
this modified inversion problem for fn can be produced from C(fn)
by assigning known values to all variables from X ′.
For the cryptanalysis problems for Bivium, Trivium and Grain
in the formulation described above we considered SAT encodings
constructed using all the aforementioned software systems. Then for
each generator we modified these encodings by fixing the values of
variables from the set X ′ ⊆ Xin. By GeneratorK we mean the SAT
instances which encode cryptanalysis of the corresponding gener-
ator, modified by assigning values to variables from some set X ′,
|X ′| = K.
Essentially, GeneratorK means a series of SAT instances that dif-
fer in values of variables from X ′. We considered such series of
100 instances each. On instances from each series we ran the CDCL
SAT solvers that rated high in SAT competition 2014 [2]: ROKK,
MINISAT BLBD, MINISAT HACK 999ED, SWDIA5BY and RISS
BLACKBOX. In case of the encodings produced by URSA we were
forced to use only the solvers CLASP and ARGOSAT embedded into
this system. To solve each instance each solver had a time limit of
one hour. During the analysis of the obtained experimental data for
each series of the kind GeneratorK we chose the best solver judging
by the amount of SAT instances solved within the time limit. The
corresponding information is shown in Table 3. Also in this table we
show the average time in seconds, that the best solver demonstrated
on solved tests.
Table 3. Solving cryptanalysis instances for Bivium, Trivium and Grain
with guessing bits (avg. time computed for solved within time limit)
GOS URSA CRYPTOL+SAW TRANSALG
BIVIUM30
Solver ROKK CLASP ROKK ROKK
Solved 100 97 100 99
Avg. time, sec. 1 037 1 415 1 188 1 042
TRIVIUM142
Solver ROKK CLASP ROKK ROKK
Solved 97 100 99 94
Avg. time, sec. 1 691 1 406 1 462 1 429
GRAIN102
Solver ROKK CLASP ROKK ROKK
Solved 59 41 56 77
Avg. time, sec. 2 007 1 689 1 479 1 589
As a final note we would like to discuss how TRANSALG differs
from other systems. The distinctive feature of TRANSALG is that it
can construct and explicitly output the template CNF C(fn). When
it constructs C(fn) it employs the concept of symbolic execution
of program Af fully reflecting this process in the memory of ab-
stract computing machine. As a result, in a template CNF C(fn)
all elementary operations with the memory of abstract machine are
represented in the form of Boolean equations over sets of Boolean
variables. TRANSALG makes it possible to work with these variables
directly, thus providing a number of useful features for cryptanaly-
sis. In particular, we can quickly generate families of cryptographic
instances: to make certain SAT instance for function inversion it is
sufficient to add to a template CNF unit clauses encoding the corre-
sponding output. That is why template CNFs are very handy when
one uses partitioning strategy [22] to solve some hard SAT instance
in a distributed computing environment. Also TRANSALG can iden-
tify variables corresponding to inputs and outputs of considered func-
tion, so external tools can be used to check correctness of SAT encod-
ings and to analyze the results of solving SAT. In particular, thanks
to this we can use any SAT solvers and preprocessors. TRANSALG
allows to monitor the values of program variables inside program Af
at any step of computing, and, therefore, to assert any conditions on
these variables. For example, thanks to this it is easy to write in a pro-
gram Af the conditions specifying the differential path for finding
collisions of cryptographic hash functions. In other considered sys-
tems (URSA, Cryptol) there arise significant difficulties when writ-
ing such conditions. Finally, let us note that the connection between
the structure of CNF C(fn) and an original algorithm, reflected by
TRANSALG, can play an important role in implementation of several
cryptographic attacks (such as guess-and-determine attacks [1]) in
parallel.
5 INVERSION OF REAL WORLD
CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS USING
TRANSALG
In this section we present our results on SAT-based cryptanalysis of
several ciphering systems, that continue to be used in practice de-
spite being compromised. First we describe the SAT-based cryptanal-
ysis of the A5/1 keystream generator. Then we present our results on
finding collisions of MD4 and MD5 cryptographic hash functions. In
all these cases we used the encodings produced by the TRANSALG
system.
5.1 SAT-based cryptanalysis of A5/1
A5/1 is probably one of the most widely known keystream gener-
ators. Despite the fact that in various sources there were described
several attacks on it (with different degrees of success), it is still used
in many countries to cipher the GSM data. The description of the
A5/1 algorithm can be found, for example, in [5].
We considered the cryptanalysis problem for the A5/1 generator in
the following formulation. We assume that we know first 114 bits of
keystream5 that were generated by the generator from 64-bit secret
key. We need to find the secret key. Therefore, essentially we need to
solve the inversion problem for the function
f
A5/1 : {0, 1}64 → {0, 1}114 (8)
specified by the A5/1 algorithm. Let C(fA5/1) be the template CNF
for this function and let Xin = {x1, . . . , x64} be the set of vari-
ables encoding the input of fA5/1. By assigning values from an ar-
bitrary y ∈ Range fA5/1 to the corresponding output variables in
C(fA5/1) we produce the CNF Cy(fA5/1).
The SAT instances encoding the inversion of function (8) are very
difficult for sequential SAT solvers. In [36] there was described the
method that can be used to solve such SAT instances in parallel. Ac-
cording to that method to solve the original cryptanalysis instance
one has to solve 231 simplified SAT instances in the worst case sce-
nario. Each of these simplified instances is produced as a result of
assigning values to variables from the special set X˜ , X˜ ⊂ Xin,
|X˜| = 31 in the CNF Cy(fA5/1). The set X˜ is called the decom-
position set and its structure is shown in [36]. All the simplified
SAT instances produced this way form a partitioning for Cy(fA5/1).
The aforementioned features of TRANSALG make it possible to ef-
fectively outline an arbitrary decomposition set in a SAT encoding.
After this each instance from a SAT partitioning, produced by set
X˜ , is constructed by adding to CNF Cy(fA5/1) the corresponding
unit clauses. These instances can be solved in parallel independently
from each other. Using this SAT partitioning strategy we solved
several dozens of cryptanalysis instances for A5/1 in a special dis-
tributed computing system. In detail the corresponding experiment is
described in [35].
Additionally we would like to note that thanks to the knowledge of
the set Xin in the SAT encoding and the use of external SAT solver
5 In the GSM protocol the messages are transmitted in blocks of 114 bits
called bursts.
we managed to significantly improve the effectiveness of cryptanaly-
sis. In particular, we modified the MINISAT 2.2 solver (in which we
increased starting activity for the variables from Xin and changed
values of parameters var decay and clause decay). Without
this we would have to spend up to 100 times more computing re-
sources on solving corresponding cryptanalysis problems.
5.2 SAT-based approach to finding collisions of
hash functions from MD family
To construct SAT encodings for finding collisions of hash functions
MD4 and MD5 we used only the TRANSALG system because of the
reasons outlined in the end of Section 4.
Let f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c be some cryptographic hash function,
that works with messages split into blocks of length n, n > c. It de-
fines the function of the kind fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}c. To produce the
SAT encoding for the problem of finding collisions of this function
we essentially translate the program describing fn twice, using dis-
joint sets of Boolean variables. Let C1 and C2 be the corresponding
CNFs in which the sets of output variables are Y 1 =
{
y11 , . . . , y
1
c
}
and Y 2 =
{
y21 , . . . , y
2
c
}
. Then finding collisions of fn is reduced to
finding an assignment that satisfies the following Boolean formula:
C1 ∧ C2 ∧
(
y
1
1 ↔ y
2
1
)
∧ . . . ∧
(
y
1
c ↔ y
2
c
)
. (9)
Note, that (9) can be extremely hard even for state-of-the-art SAT
solvers. This is particularly the case for the hash functions of the MD
family [33]. To make this problem solvable in realistic time we added
to SAT for (9) the constraints, that arise in differential attacks on the
considered hash functions [42, 43]. Note that the first implementation
of a similar attack on MD4 and MD5 in the SAT form was described
in [30]. To produce the corresponding SAT encodings the authors
of [30] used the encoding technique developed specifically for the
considered hash functions. In Table 4 we compare characteristics of
the SAT instances for finding collisions of MD4 and MD5, that were
used in [30], with that of encodings produced with the TRANSALG
system.
Table 4. The parameters of encodings for hash functions MD4 and MD5
Encodings from [30] TRANSALG
MD4 variables 53 228 19 363
clauses 221 440 184 689
MD5 variables 89 748 35 477
clauses 375 176 304 728
First, we considered the problem of finding single block collisions
of the MD4 hash function (taking into account the differential paths
from [42]). The authors of [30] note that in their implementation of
attack on MD4 it took about 500 seconds to find one collision. Using
the SAT encodings produced by TRANSALG and CRYPTOMINISAT
solver [39] we managed to find about 1000 MD4 collisions within
500 seconds on one core of Intel i5-3570T (4 Gb RAM).
After this we studied the problem of finding two-block colli-
sions of MD5. Note that the hash functions of the MD family
are based on the Merkle-Damgard construction [29, 13] and work
with the messages split into 512-bit blocks. More precisely, the
hash value is computed iteratively for the message split into N
512-bit blocks M1, . . . ,MN . Let us denote by hj the hash value
computed at the iteration number j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then accord-
ing to the Merkle-Damgard construction, hj = fMD(hj−1,Mj).
The value h0 is called the Initial Value (IV) and is usually fixed
in the algorithm specification. The process of constructing the
two-block collision of MD5 has two stages. In the first stage we
search for two 512-bit blocks M1 and M ′1, for which the differ-
ence between hash values modulo 232 is equal to (0x80000000,
0x82000000, 0x82000000, 0x82000000), in accordance
with the constraints on the differential path from [43]. These con-
straints as well as a number of additional constraints referred to in
[43] as bit conditions were added to the resulting SAT encoding.
We denote h1 = fMD5(IV,M1), h′1 = fMD5(IV,M ′1). In the
second stage we look for second 512 blocks M2 and M ′2 such that
fMD5(h1,M2) = f
MD5(h′1,M
′
2).
The SAT instances encoding the search for M1 and M ′1 turned out
to be too difficult for the majority of the solvers that we tested. We
were able to obtain consistent results for these problems only using
PLINGELING and TREENGELING solvers [3] (versions from the SAT
competition 2014 [2]). We used a computing cluster, each comput-
ing node of which contains 2 AMD Opteron 6276 processors (32
processor cores in one node). On each computing node we ran one
copy of PLINGELING or TREENGELING in multi-threaded mode (32
threads). On different computing nodes we ran several such copies
in parallel. The solving time on different nodes varied significantly:
from several hours to several days.
During experiments we noticed the following interesting phe-
nomenon: the TREENGELING solver found several blocks M1 and
M ′1 with a lot of zeroes in the beginning. A more detailed analysis
showed that if we assign first 10 bytes in M1 and M ′1 with 0s then
the corresponding SAT instance is satisfiable, but if in addition to
this we assign 0 to the 11-th byte, then the CNF becomes unsatisfi-
able (and the solver gives the corresponding answer quite fast). Thus
we outlined the class of pairs of the kind M1 and M ′1 that satisfy the
differential path from [43], and have first 10 zero bytes. In 89 hours
using 15 cluster nodes (480 cores) we managed to find 20 pairs of
the described kind. For the obtained pairs (M1,M ′1) the problem
of constructing such pairs (M2,M ′2) that the messages M1|M2 and
M ′1|M
′
2 form the two-block collision of MD5, turned out to be rela-
tively simple: on average one such pair (M2,M ′2) was found by the
PLINGELING solver in 400 seconds on one cluster node. An example
of the collision of this kind is shown in Table 5.
Table 5. MD5 two-block collisions with 10 zero bytes in the beginning
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 5c 2f 3c f5 48
32 1e cc a0 bf 25 b9 bd ed 93 8d 88 c3 c9 f5 e4
55 2d 34 05 06 c6 b3 00 9b f4 b2 83 75 71 fa 1e
f3 26 84 73 04 57 ab 23 0e ca 73 02 d6 5b a3 aa
M 54 4f 48 19 c2 3d b1 f4 12 2b 6e 8d 9f 31 40 ad
c6 f4 66 99 fc 02 44 dd 14 09 a0 47 d0 c8 5d af
c1 bf b6 6e 51 d7 f5 87 d6 81 32 d8 93 00 e4 dd
0f 59 e5 6b 96 f9 9b e4 13 df 64 ae 90 69 b6 a6
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 5c 2f 3c f5 48
32 1e cc 20 bf 25 b9 bd ed 93 8d 88 c3 c9 f5 e4
55 2d 34 05 06 c6 b3 00 9b f4 b2 83 75 f1 fa 1e
f3 26 84 73 04 57 ab 23 0e ca 73 82 d6 5b a3 aa
M
′ 54 4f 48 19 c2 3d b1 f4 12 2b 6e 8d 9f 31 40 ad
c6 f4 66 19 fc 02 44 dd 14 09 a0 47 d0 c8 5d af
c1 bf b6 6e 51 d7 f5 87 d6 81 32 d8 93 80 e3 dd
0f 59 e5 6b 96 f9 9b e4 13 df 64 2e 90 69 b6 a6
H 178477e15fde4ff267aa55438d539b16
In conclusion we would like to once more point out the features of
TRANSALG system that made it possible to obtain the presented re-
sults. It is mainly thanks to the translation concept of TRANSALG that
allows one to directly work with variables encoding each elementary
step of considered algorithm. That is why we can effectively reflect
in SAT encoding any additional constraints, such as, for example, the
ones that specify a differential path. In similar software systems this
step requires a significant amount of work to be implemented.
6 RELATED WORK
The research on applying combinatorial algorithms to solving crypt-
analysis problems has been actively conducted for the recent 10-
15 years. The idea to use cryptanalysis instances as hard tests for
Boolean satisfiability solvers was first expressed in [11]. The work
[27] contains one of the first examples of propositional encodings of
cryptographic functions. It should be noted that the SAT instances
from [27] and several other later papers turned out to be too difficult
for SAT solvers and therefore did not allow researchers to perform
the cryptanalysis of the corresponding cryptographic systems. The
work [30] was the first successful attempt to apply SAT to cryptanal-
ysis instances for the relevant (at that moment) ciphering systems.
The monograph [1] studies various aspects of algebraic cryptanal-
ysis. Quite significant part of this work contains the results on ap-
plication of SAT solvers to solving algebraic equations over finite
fields.
In our opinion, cryptanalysis of keystream generators using the
SAT approach is quite promising area of research, because increasing
the speed of stream ciphering often leads to the decrease of complex-
ity of inversion problem of the corresponding function. A number of
papers studied the application of SAT to cryptanalysis of keystream
generators. In [28] the Bivium cipher was studied using the MINISAT
solver. Later this direction of research was developed in [17]. In [39]
the abilities of the CRYPTOMINISAT solver in application to crypt-
analysis of several keystream generators (including Bivium) were
demonstrated. In [36] using SAT in a distributed environment sev-
eral cryptanalysis instances of the A5/1 keystream generator were
solved.
In [34] there was described the method for automated search for
SAT partitionings and its application to finding new partitionings for
the SAT instances encoding the cryptanalysis of A5/1 ang Bivium
generators. Using these partitionings it was possible to improve the
estimations for Bivium that were presented in [39].
The first example of application of SAT to finding collisions of
cryptographic hash functions was proposed in [24]. In [30] for the
first time the collisions of cryptographic hash functions from the MD
family were constructed using SAT. The key idea of that paper, which
made it possible to succeed, was to augment the SAT encodings of
the considered hash functions with additional Boolean constraints
encoding the differential paths from [42, 43]. In [14, 26] there are
some results on application of SAT to inversion attacks on crypto-
graphic hash functions from the MD family.
In recent years the SAT community has developed many encod-
ing techniques that can be applied to a wide class of combinato-
rial problems. A lot of references to key papers in this area can be
found in [32]. There is a number of systems for automated encoding
of Constraint Satisfaction Problem to SAT (for example, [21, 37],
among others). However, the automated systems that can effectively
encode cryptographic functions to SAT (if we take into account var-
ious aspects that are specific for cryptography) are rare. Apart from
TRANSALG these are the GRAIN OF SALT [38], URSA [23] and
CRYPTOL+SAW [18, 19] tools. The detailed comparison of the men-
tioned systems with TRANSALG can be found in Section 4 of the
present paper.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In the present paper we introduced the TRANSALG system designed
to automatically translate the inversion problems of discrete func-
tions to SAT. We used TRANSALG to solve inversion problems of
several cryptographic functions. The source code of the TRANSALG
system can be found in the repository6. Examples of TA-programs
and the corresponding template CNFs constructed using TRANSALG,
and also all cryptanalysis tests we studied in Sections 4-5 and found
MD5 collisions of described kind are available in the repository7 .
In our opinion, with the use of TRANSALG we clearly demon-
strated the practical applicability of SAT-based cryptanalysis. We be-
lieve that this direction of research is very promising and intend to
obtain new interesting results on this path. In particular, we plan to
apply SAT-based cryptanalysis to inversion of several hash functions.
From our point of view it is possible to achieve the results similar
to that of [15]: that some hash functions with truncated number of
rounds are not one-way. Also we are going to study the effective-
ness of SAT-based cryptanalysis in application to finding collisions
of hash functions using various differential paths, which are differ-
ent from that found in [42, 43]. For example, it will be interesting
to construct and study the SAT encodings based on the differential
paths from [40].
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